Playing the wrong game: . . . strategic misrepresentation by Giovanna Devetag & Massimo Warglien
Playing the wrong game:
An experimental analysis of relational complexity and
strategic misrepresentation∗
Giovanna Devetag†
Department of Law and Management
University of Perugia
Via Pascoli 20, 06123 Perugia, Italy
devetag@unipg.it
Massimo Warglien
Department of Business Economics and Management
Ca’Foscari University of Venice
San Giobbe - Cannaregio 873, Venice, Italy
warglien@unive.it
∗Financial support from the Italian Ministry of University and Research (PRIN 2005) and from the
Cognitive Science Laboratory of Rovereto is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Yaakov Kareev, Marco
LiCalzi, Andreas Ortmann, Burkhard Schipper, Reinhard Selten, seminar participants in Graz, Lyon,
Barcelona, Prague and Rome, two anonymous referees and an associate editor for useful comments and
suggestions. We thank Marco Tecilla and IvanSoraperra for the design of the experimentalsoftware. The
usual disclaimer applies.
†Corresponding author. Tel. +39-0755855271. Fax +39-0755855257.
1Abstract
It has been suggested that players often produce simpliﬁed and/or misspeciﬁed
mental models of strategic decisions (Kreps, 1990). We submit that the relational
structure of players’ preferences in a game is a source of cognitive complexity, and
may be an important driver of such simpliﬁcations. We provide a classiﬁcation of
order structures in two-person games based on the properties of monotonicity and
projectivity, and present experiments in which subjects construct representations
of games of different relational complexity and subsequently play the games ac-
cording to these representations. Experimental results suggest that relational com-
plexity matters. More complex games are harder to represent, and this difﬁculty
seems correlated with short term memory capacity. In addition, most erroneous
representations are simpler than the correct ones. Finally, subjects who misrepre-
sent the games behave consistently with such representations, suggesting that in
many strategic settings individuals may act optimally on the ground of simpliﬁed
and mistaken premises.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: C70, C72, C91, D01
Keywords: pure motive, mixed motive, preferences, bi-orders, language, cognition,
projectivity, monotonicity, short term memory, experiments
21 Introduction
While it is generally assumed that the structure of a game is well understood and com-
mon knowledge among players, some game theorists have challenged this assumption.
For example, Kreps (1990) has suggested that “in choosing his actions in the short run,
the individual builds a model of his choice problem, a model which is typically a sim-
pliﬁcation or a misspeciﬁcation (or both) of the ‘true situation”’ (pp. 152). However,
how do individualssimplify or misspecify the ‘true situation’ is still a rather unexplored
issue.
An important early exception is Thomas Schelling’s classic book, The strategy of
conﬂict. Schelling reports John Strachey, the former British Defense Minister, telling
him that although he had known that conﬂict could coexist with common interest, he
had thought that the two were inherently separable, and had never considered them as
part of an integrated structure (Schelling 1980, vi). Strachey’s words neatly capture an
important idea in Schelling’s (1960) book: that representing others’ strategic motiva-
tions may be a source of cognitive difﬁculty for players when coordination and conﬂict
motives are intertwined in the same game.
For this purpose Schelling introduces a basic and important distinction between
“pure motive” and “mixed motive” games. The former are games in which prefer-
ences of players are rank-correlated, as in the protoypicalexamples of pure coordination
games (positive correlation) and conﬂict games (negative correlation). The latter games
present a more complex, non correlated structure of preferences, blending coordination
opportunities with antagonistic motivations. The point Schelling makes is that while
pure motive games are in general easy to grasp, mixed motive games are puzzling and
inherently harder to understand. He strikingly remarks that while our vocabulary is rich
of words designating common interest or adversarial relationships, there are no words
to designate the relation between players in a mixed motive game1: while we have a
1An associate editor suggested marriage as an example of a typical mixed-motive relationship.
3rich lexicon for partners or for opponents, how to designate someone who is a partner
and an opponent at the same time?
A similar issue has sometimes surfaced in attempts to provide game theoretic pre-
scriptive advice to decision makers. For example, Adam Brandenburger and Barry
Nalebuff’s (1996) bestseller makes a central argument that managers seldom correctly
identify the peculiar mix of competition and cooperation hidden in most business inter-
actions (they feel a revealing need to ﬁll the gap in our dictionaries, coining the hybrid
word: co-opetition). Furthermore, it has been repeatedly observed that often bargainers
(both in the lab and in real negotiations) tend to miss opportunities to reach agree-
ments on the efﬁcient frontier due to the blinding effects of the “mythical ﬁxed pie bias”
(Bazerman 1983), inducing them to represent the intrinsically mixed-motivebargaining
problem as a cognitively simpler constant sum game. Anecdotal evidence from the his-
tory of decision making also abounds; for example, Robert McNamara’s (1999) recent
reappraisal of “missed opportunities” during the Vietnam war provides a rich sample
of episodes in which decision makers from both conﬂicting parties essentially failed
to recognize the existence of possible cooperation within conﬂict and, more generally,
recognizes misrepresentations - “wrong mindsets”, in his words - of the nature of the
ongoing interaction as a major driver of the evolution of the war.
In this paper, we experimentally address the issue of what makes it difﬁcult for
an individual to build a correct mental model of a strategic situation and, following
Schelling’s intuition, we start by focusing on how different payoff structures present
different challenges for theindividuals’cognitiveabilityto represent thegamecorrectly.
More speciﬁcally, we investigate the difﬁculty to correctly represent the relations of
players’ preferences over the game outcomes. For this purpose we introduce the notion
of relational complexity of a two-person game representation, and we deﬁne it in terms
of the structural properties of bi-orders representing the players’ payoffs.
Since wewant toinvestigatetheextenttowhichstrategicdecisionmakingisaffected
4by misrepresentations of the underlying game structure, we proceed in two steps. First,
wetakea“semantic”stance, andlookdirectlyatthecognitivedifﬁcultiesinrepresenting
intertwined order relations which are isomorphic to the preference structures of some
classical games. We believe that this may help to disentangle representational factors
from othercognitiveand behavioralcomponents, and mayprovideabroader perspective
on the difﬁculties of representing interactive situations. Subsequently, we move to a
classical decision making context, looking at how representation difﬁculties interact
with actual decision making - i.e., how some puzzling behaviors may be interpreted in
the light of erroneous underlying models of the game.
Our experimental results conﬁrm the appropriateness of our classiﬁcation for the
purpose of understanding individual failures in representing complex relational struc-
tures. When facing games of high relational complexity, individuals tend to construct
simpler representations, often of a pure-motive type. Thus, although introducing a ﬁner
classiﬁcation, our results conﬁrm that Schelling’s insight was essentially correct, i.e.,
order relations associated to mixed motive games are signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult to rep-
resent than those mirroring pure motive games. We also show that failures in represent-
ing order structures of higher complexity are correlated with individual computational
capability, as approximated by a measure of short term memory capacity.
In addition, we show that behavior of individuals misrepresenting games is con-
sistent with their erroneous representations. In a way, such individuals play a different
game, of a simplernature. Moreover, since their misrepresentations are most of the time
amenableto basicsolutionconcepts, such subjects displaybehaviorconsistentwithvery
simple but rational criteria such as dominance or selection of actions supporting payoff-
dominant equilibria.
Section 2 of the paper shortly introduces a formal classiﬁcation of bi-ordered struc-
tures, which can be applied to preference relations in two-person games. For this pur-
pose we introduce the property of projectivity. Projectivity and its complement (non-
5projectivity) well capture, in our view, the degree of entanglement of multiple order
relations, as will be better clariﬁed in the next section. Section 3 presents an experiment
on the representation of bi-ordered structures and its relation to short term memory ca-
pacity. Section 4 describes a behavioral experiment in which the representation task
is embedded in actual game playing. We analyze once more representational mistakes
and relate them to the interpretation of subjects’ strategic behavior. Finally, section 5
discusses some implications of our results and the relationship with other streams of
research in behavioral game theory.
2 Bi-orders and Preference Structures
Agameisusuallycomposedofstrategies,players(includingNature), andpayoffswhich
determine the players’ preferences over the set of outcomes. Sources of cognitive difﬁ-
culty for individuals may in principle arise from any of these elements alone, or, possi-
bly, from theircombination. Thecomplexityofthestrategyspace isindeed an important
source of constraints to players’ full rationality in games (chess being the paradigmatic
example: e.g., Simon and Schaeffer, 1992), as partisans of bounded rationality have
often suggested, and as an abounding experimental evidence by now conﬁrms.
Much less attention, however, has been paid so far to possible cognitive difﬁculties
arising from the structure of preferences implied by a game 2.
This diffuse neglect notwithstanding, there is increasing evidence that players can
experience serious difﬁculties in reasoning strategically even in games in which the
number of stage-game strategies is very small, as in very simple normal form games
(e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Devetag, Legrenzi and Warglien,
1999; Costa-Gomez, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001). Since in these games strategic
2Ariel Rubinstein has recently shown some constraints on deﬁning preferences in a simple proposi-
tional language: see Rubinstein (2000, ch. 4).
6complexity cannot arise from the action space, we suggest that one should look at the
structure of players’ preferences as an important source of difﬁculty for strategic think-
ing in such situations. After all, what distinguishes a game situation from an individual
decision making task is the need to jointly take into account both one’s own and the
other players’ preferences, and this may indeed result in non trivial complexity even in
those cases in which the strategy space is not exceedingly complicated.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to simple, two-person normal form game
structures. A peculiar feature of two-person strategic form games is that the outcomes
of strategy proﬁles (i.e., the cells of the bi-matrix) constitute a bi-ordered set, as the
preference order of both players is imposed on them. In order to reason strategically on
the game, hence, a player must mentally represent two preference orders, her own and
the other player’s.
In general, bi-orders can have structures of different complexity. A useful typology
of bi-orders, which originated in algebraic linguistics (Marcus, 1967; Schreider, 1975;
Mel’cuk, 1988) and which is largely used in the theory of parsing, distinguishes levels
of intricacy in the interrelation between two orders on the same set using the properties
of monotonicity and projectivity.
Before introducing a few formal deﬁnitions, an informal presentation of such prop-
erties may be useful.
A bi-order is a pair of order relations (say, ← and <) on a set S. Let’s assume for
the sake of simplicity that both relations are linear orders 3. A bi-order is monotonic if
one relation preserves the order of the other (the bi-order is isotonic) or it just reverses
it (the bi-order is antitonic). Projectivity can be intuitively expressed by saying that if
one writes down the sequence of elements of S according to the < relation, and draws
the arrows directly subordinating (i.e., covering) the same elements according to ←, the
3Onecangeneralizedeﬁnitionstononstrictorderrelationsandtothecaseinwhichoneoftherelations
is a tree. See for example Schreider (1975).
7← covering arrows should never cross each other. Finally, a bi-order is non-projective
when it is not projective. Non projectivity can be intuitively expressed by saying that
there is no way to arrange the sequence of elements of S according to the < relationship,
in such a way that the ← arrows never cross each other.
Fig. 1 shows an example with four elements and two different types of arrows -
continuous and dashed - representing the covering relations of < and ← respectively.
= Fig. 1 here =
More formally:
DEFINITION 1: Monotonic projectivity:
Let ai, aj ∈ S, and let ← and < be two linear order relations deﬁned on S; a doubly
ordered set S is called isotonically projective if:
for i  = j ai < aj iff ai ← aj
It is called antitonically projective if:
for i  = j ai < aj iff aj ← ai
It is called monotonically projective if it is isotonically projective or antitonically pro-
jective.
DEFINITION 2: Projectivity:
Let ai, aj, ak ∈ S, and let ← and < be two linear order relations deﬁned on S; further-
more, let ֋ be the covering relation of ←4. A doubly ordered set S is called projective
if one and only one of the following conditions holds:
a) (strict projectivity) for ai  = aj  = ak, ai ֋ aj and min(ai, aj) < ak < max(ai, aj)
imply the relation ak ← aj.
4The covering relation for linear orders is usually deﬁned as follows (Davey and Priestley, 1990).
Given an ordered set A, a linear order relation ← and ai, aj, ak ∈ A, aj covers ai (ai ֋ aj) if ai ֋ aj
implies that there are no ak such that: ai ← ak ← ai.
8b) (quasi-projectivity) for ai  = aj  = ak, ai ֋ aj and min(ai, aj) < ak < max(ai, aj)
imply the relation ai ← ak.
DEFINITION 3: Non projectivity:
A bi-ordered set is called non projective if it is neither monotonically projective nor
projective.
Since monotonic projectivity is nested into projectivity, one can naturally hypoth-
esize a hierarchy of cognitive difﬁculty: monotonic projective structures are easier to
represent than projective (but non monotonic) structures, which in turn are easier to
represent than non projective ones. Furthermore, since antitonic projective structures
require to reverse one order to obtain the other one, it is reasonable to expect that they
may be (slightly) more difﬁcult than isotonic projective structures. Linguistics provides
some support to this claim in the domain of language. Language is a system that has
multiple order structures simultaneously acting on it: there is the sequential order of
words in a phrase, as well as many other layers of syntactical (and semantic) order.
For example, to parse a phrase we must be able to recognize and process altogether
such order relations. A fairly well explored example is how the linear order of words
relates to the dependency order - i.e. the order induced by head-modiﬁer relations in
a sentence. A dependency A-B (where A is the governing node of a syntactical tree)
is projective iff all the words between A and B are included in the sub-tree of B. For
example, while “I solved only that same poignant question” is projective, “Solved only
that same I poignant question” is non-projective (Schreider, 1975). Empirical analysis
(see Marcus (1967, ch. 6 for a review) has shown that near 100% of natural language
sentences are projective (with non-projective sentences usually conﬁned to literary us-
age). More recent, extensive empirical work substantially conﬁrms these results. For
example, an analysis of the so-called “Prague dependency treebank”, coding a sam-
ple of about 30,000 Czech sentences, has found that less than 2% of the sentences are
9non-projective (Schwartz, 1998). The importance of projectivity can be understood on
the ground that such property allows to introduce a proper bracketing structure into the
sentence: in other words, it allows to properly decompose the sentence itself into con-
stituents. This in turn allows to manage complex sentences in the presence of working
memory constraints (the interactions between working memory constraints, complex
nested sentences, and understanding performance are analyzed in Just and Carpenter,
1992).
Two-person games are bi-ordered structures: our hypothesis is that the cognitive
difﬁculty in representing a game should depend, among other things, on the speciﬁc
structure of preferences. Pure motive games are monotonically projective structures -
in which the two preference relations perfectly coincide - thus they are the easiest to
represent; mixed motive games can be of two types: projective ones (like for example
“chicken games”) or non projective ones (like for example PD’s). The latter should be
harder to represent, and therefore understand, than the former.
3 Representing Bi-orders: Experiment 1
3.1 Description of the experiment and discussion of results
Our central claim is that there are cognitive constraints in jointly representing multiple
order relationships. These constraints seem not speciﬁc of game playing only, as the
example of language suggests. Thus, we expect them to emerge in more general repre-
sentational tasks. In order to test our hypothesis, we designed a simple experiment in
which subjects were provided with a set of objects that could be ordered by two types
of order relations and had to select a subset of them that satisﬁed such order relations.
In semantic terms, the task consists in representing a state of affairs (a “world”) that
satisﬁes a formula built up with two order relations. In particular, we tested the hy-
pothesis that different bi-orders induce different levels of representational difﬁculty. As
10the reader will remind, we hypothesize the following order of difﬁculty: non projective
⊲ projective (but non monotonic) ⊲ antitonically projective ⊲ isotonically projective,
with ⊲ indicating the “more difﬁcult than” relation.
The elements our experimental subjects had to deal with were squares which differed
along the two features of SIZE and COLOR (actually, shades of grey). Squares are
very familiar objects, and size and color are equally familiar order relations, henceforth
we expected that no peculiar difﬁculties could arise in understanding the task. A set
of 16 squares was shown to subjects, and their task was to select, out of this set, four
squares which would satisfy simultaneously two order relations (size and color) given
to them. The experiment was computerized, of the “drag and drop” type (Fig. 2 reports
a sample of the graphical interface used). The upper part of the screen reported the 16
squares from which subjects had to select their “building blocks”. Four empty cells in
the bottom part of the screen were the TARGET to be ﬁlled in with squares taken from
the upper part so as to satisfy the formula. Instructions explained the meaning of order
relations and provided examples5.
Instructions also stressed the fact that the particular position of the four squares in the
TARGET area of the screen did not matter, as long as the four squares satisﬁed the two
order relations given. In order to perform the task, subjects had simply to click with
the mouse on one of the squares in the table and “drag” it into one of the cells in the
TARGET.
= Fig. 2 here =
Subjects were presented with the four pairs of order relations shown in ﬁg. 1, which
are order-isomorphic to the payoff structures of the four two-person strategic games
shown in tables 1-4.
5All the instructions of the experiments reported in this article can be downloaded from
www.unipg.it/˜devetag/Instructions GEB.htm.
11= Tab. 1 to 4 here =
In fact, the reader can easily check that the structure of payoffs in the coordination
game with Pareto-ranked equilibria is isotonically projective. The pure conﬂict game
corresponds to the case of antitonic projectivity. The projective case is drawn using the
chicken game as a template, while the non-projective case is modelled after a Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
Thus, the following four pairs of order relations were presented to subjects:
• isotonic projectivity (monotonic)
S(W) > S(Z) > S(Y ) > S(X)
C(W) → C(Z) → C(Y ) → C(X)
• antitonic projectivity (monotonic)
S(W) > S(Z) > S(Y ) > S(X)
C(X) → C(Y ) → C(Z) → C(W)
• projectivity (non-monotonic)
S(X) > S(Y ) > S(Z) > S(W)
C(Z) → C(Y ) → C(X) → C(W)
• non-projectivity
S(X) > S(Y ) > S(Z) > S(W)
C(W) → C(Y ) → C(Z) → C(X)
S denotes SIZE and C denotes COLOR. The four squares are labelled X, Y, Z, and W.
A ﬁrst experimental session was conducted at the University of Venice, and it in-
volved a pool of 30 subjects who were students enrolled in a Master in Business Ad-
ministration. The subjects had a monetary incentive to give correct responses in the
experiment, as they were paid a ﬁxed fee for their participation, plus an amount of 3
12euros for each correct answer. The pool was divided into two sub-groups in which the
order of presentation of the four bi-orders was varied, to control for learning effects.
The experiment was subsequently replicated with identical conditions at the Com-
putable and Experimental Economics Lab of the University of Trento, using a pool of
40 undergraduate students recruited by posting ads at the various department buildings.
Table 5 reports the numbers and relative frequencies of correct responses per task in the
Venice and Trento pools respectively, distinguishing between the two sub-groups.
= Table 5 here =
Differences in the number of correct answers between the two sub-groups in each of
thefourtasksare notstatisticallysigniﬁcantinboththeVeniceandTrentopool(p ≥ .40,
Fisher exact test): therefore we can refer to the pooled data in the last column of the ta-
ble. The ﬁrst thing to notice by looking at aggregate results is that, notwithstanding
the relatively better performance of the Trento pool in each task, the observed frequen-
cies of correct answers in both pools suggest an order of difﬁculty that exactly mirrors
our hypothesis: relations which are monotonically projective are relatively easy to con-
struct, with the isotonic one easier than the antitonic. On the contrary, non-monotonic
projective and non-projective bi-orders seem relatively more difﬁcult. No statistical dif-
ferences were found between the observed frequencies in the two experiments (p-values
range from .17 to .76, Mann-Whitney U test), therefore from now on we refer to the
pooled data.
Clearly, aggregate analysis alone is not sufﬁciently informative in this experiment,
as the single observations (performance in each task) are not independent. Hence, we
performed non-parametric tests on the individual strings of successes (1) and failures
(0) in the four tasks to test against the null hypothesis that successes and failures were
randomly distributed.
13A Cochran test performed on the four related samples allows to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the correct answers in the tasks are equally distributed at the 1% signiﬁ-
cance level6. We can hence reject the null hypothesis that the four tasks presented an
identical level of difﬁculty for our subjects.
23 subjects made no mistakes in any of the four tasks, while 2 subjects made the
highest possible number (4) of mistakes. Disregarding these 25 subjects’ performances
as noninformative, out of the remaining 45 subjects, 35 (78%) behaved in accordance
with our conjecture, i.e., they made mistakes in a way that did not violate our hypoth-
esized hierarchy of difﬁculty. More speciﬁcally, 17 subjects made a mistake only in
the non-projectivetask, 9 constructed both monotonicbi-orders correctly but made mis-
takes in the projective and non-projective tasks, and 9 correctly constructed only the
isotonic case. Excluding the extreme cases of everything right and everything wrong,
there are fourteen possible strings of 1’s and 0’s of length 4, of which the only three that
are strictly consistent with our conjecture - assuming the sequence isotonic-antitonic-
projective-nonprojective -, are the following: 1-1-1-0, 1-1-0-0-, 1-0-0-0. If all strings
were equiprobable, we should expect to ﬁnd approximately 3/14 × 45 = 9.2 strings
that conﬁrm our hypothesis, instead of the 35 that appeared in our data. The difference
between the observed and the theoretical distribution is statistically signiﬁcant at the
p = .001 level by a Chi-square test.
We subsequently made pairwise comparisons by applying a McNemar test. All
differences between pairs are statistically signiﬁcant (Isotonic-antitonic bi-order: p =
.002; isotonic-non-projective bi-order: p = .000; isotonic-projective bi-order: p =
.000; antitonic-non projective bi-order: p = .022; non projective-projective bi-order:
p = .003; McNemar test) except the difference between the antitonic and the projective
bi-order (p = .096), which is only weakly signiﬁcant.
6Cochran’s Q = 52.796, p = .000.
14Hence, the data strongly conﬁrm our hypothesis in all but the antitonic-projective
pair, although also in this last case observed frequencies of mistakes are as expected.
Additional insight can be gained by conducting an analysis of the most common
types of errors that subjects made. While mistakes in the “projective” task show a
relatively high variance, mistakes in the “non-projective” task show a rather revealing
pattern. In fact, of the thirty-nine subjects who did not answer correctly in this task,
twenty (51.3%) constructed an antitonic bi-order, while ﬁfteen (38.5%) constructed an
isotonic bi-order.
Thus, as we hypothesized, individuals, out of a non-projective pair of relations, tend
to simplify their representations by perceiving and extracting monotonic bi-orders.
3.2 Short-term Memory Capacity and Representation
Why should some bi-order structures be harder to represent than others? Research in
the psychology of mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) has repeatedly - although not
conclusively - suggested that short -term memory constraints may hinder the individual
ability to edit a complete, accurate mental representation of a given task-environment.
Since the pioneering work of George Miller (1956), it is well-known that individuals
can hold only a limited amount of information active in their short-term memory, which
is a basic bottleneck in human information processing. Thus, complex structures may
overload individual short-term memory capacity, causing incomplete, over-simpliﬁed
and often mistaken representations of these structures. The load on short-term memory
capacity, however, may be reduced by the ability to compress informationor decompose
it into smaller components.
Clearly, bi-ordered structures differ in the way information can be compressed or
decomposed. For example, isotone bi-orders can be simply processed as a single order,
while antitone ones can be easily obtained by reversing a single order. The case of pro-
jective and non-projective bi-orders is less trivial. However, projective structures have
15the property of naturally generating a proper decomposition into a tree of constituents.
To see this, it sufﬁces to bracket each pair of elements related by the covering relation
֋ of ←. For example, exploiting the usual order of parentheses and starting from the
least element of the chain ordered by ֋ , one obtains the bracketing shown in ﬁg. 3 in
the case of a projective bi-order:
= Fig. 3 here =
This bracketing is “proper”, meaning that parentheses are nested.
Projectivity implies that a proper bracketing always arises. This follows naturally
from the property that the ֋ arrows do not intersect in projective bi-orders.
On the contrary, it is easy to see that non-projective structures fail to generate such
decomposition, as it is shown in ﬁg. 4:
= Fig. 4 here =
Consequently, there are good reasons to hypothesize that the short-term memory
load of editing the representation of a projective bi-order is signiﬁcantly lowered by
the possibility of decomposing it into a tree of constituents (which even a simple stack
memory device could easily manage: see Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979). Non-projective
bi-orders on the contrary do not present such a decomposability property, and thus force
one to consider all elements and their order relations simultaneously.
It hasbeen shownthat individualsdifferintheirshort-termmemorycapacity(Miller,
1956; Baddeley, 1990). Hence, if short-term memory capacity limitations are a source
of difﬁculty in representing bi-orders, one should expect the performance of individuals
in our experiment to be correlated with their memory capacity.
In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted a standard Wechsler digit span test
for short-term memory capacity (e.g., Walsch and Betz, 1990; see also Devetag and
16Warglien, 2003 for a related experiment) on 38 of the 40 subjects of the Trento pool in
a separate experimental session. This simple test consists in asking subjects to repeat
a series of digits which are to be read by the experimenter at the rate of one digit per
second. The test is conducted sequentially on two independent sets of digit series of
increasing length. For each set, the test stops when the participant fails to correctly
repeat a given series. The subject’s ‘score’ in each set is given by the length of the
last series that was repeated correctly (so, for example, if a subject fails to correctly
repeat a series of length 6, her score will be equal to 5). The subject’s ﬁnal score is then
given by the higher among the two scores that were achieved in the sets. Although the
score needs not directly reﬂect the number of ‘short-term memory slots’ available to an
individual, it is generally assumed that higher scores correspond to a higher short-term
memory capacity.
We computed the correlation between subjects’score in the memory test and the
total number of correct responses in the representation experiment. The Spearman rho
coefﬁcient equals .310, and theKendalltau rank-correlation coefﬁcient equals .362 (p <
.05, one-tailed for both coefﬁcients). Hence, both tests support our hypothesis of a
signiﬁcant correlation between individualshort-term memory capacity and performance
in the experiment.
= Table 6 here =
Table 6 reports the mean STM score of subjects who were successful and of those
who were unsuccessful in each of the four tasks. A T-test performed on average scores
in the two samples reveals statistically signiﬁcant differences in the case of the conﬂict
and chicken games, while the differences in the coordination game and the PD are not
signiﬁcant. A plausible explanation for these results, besides the small data sample in
the coordination case, is that differences in short term memory bounds are likely to
17emerge more strongly in tasks of intermediate difﬁculty. In fact, if the task is very easy
most people can solve it no matter how low their memory capacity is, and if the task is
very difﬁcult the workload is such that even people with high scores can make mistakes,
as our data on the coordination game and the PD show.
This explanation is strengthened by looking at the correlation between memory
scores and the number of correct responses in the coordination and conﬂict games only
(Kendall’s tau-b = .275, p = .036, and Spearman’s Rho = .297, p = .035), or between
memory scores and numbers of correct responses in all tasks except the PD (Kendall’s
tau-b = .297, p = .025, and Spearman’s Rho = .321, p = .025). The values indicate that
a considerable portion of the correlation found is preserved by restricting its calculation
to performance in the monotonic and projective tasks only.
4 Experiment2: Representationofgamesandlinkswith
behavior
4.1 Experimental design and implementation
Having veriﬁed the cognitivedifﬁculty of representing different classes of bi-orders, our
second experiment is aimed at assessing how these difﬁculties affect game playing. For
this purpose, we designed an experiment in which subjects had to construct a represen-
tation of the four games depicted in tables 1-4, and subsequently choose a strategy in
each game. The experiment was divided in two parts. At the beginning of the experi-
ment, subjects were told that in the second part they would participate in four interactive
decision making tasks, and in each task they would be paired with a randomly selected
opponent. In each decisionmaking task each playercould choosebetween two available
moves. The four resulting combinations of choices generated four different scenarios
(called A, B, C and D), each implyingdifferent payoffs forthetwo players. Thepossible
18payoffs in each game could range from 1 to 4 experimental points for each player, and
would be represented by squares differing in color and size. A player’s payoff depended
on color (the darker the square, the higher the payoff), while the other player’s payoff
depended in the same way on the square size. In the ﬁrst part of the experiment subjects
would have to visually represent the four games according to pairs of order relations
like the one in experiment 1. This was done by selecting, among a set of 16 squares, the
four that satisﬁed the relations given; hence, the ﬁrst part of the experiment was essen-
tially equivalent to experiment 1, with the difference that subjects knew that they were
representing interactive decision making tasks that would be the object of the second
part of the experiment, and that the color and size of the squares represented their and
their opponents’ payoffs in the games. Since our interest is in bi-orders, also in this
case we kept a geometric, and hence purely ordinal, representation of payoffs avoiding
their direct translation into numbers. For the same reason, we avoided imposing further
representational structure by using devices such as game matrices, leaving instead the
simple linear display of geometric ﬁgures used in experiment 1.
The instructions stated that the representational task was strictly individual and that
earnings in that task were solely a function of the number of games correctly repre-
sented, whereas earnings in the second part were contingent on one’s own and one’s
opponent choices in the games. In order to emphasize the effects of working memory
constraints we introduced a time limit of 120 seconds to complete each representation,
and the four games appeared to each subject in a random order to control for learning
effects.
In the second part of the experiment, each subject’s computer terminal displayed
the four representations that she had constructed in the ﬁrst part, one at a time, and
the subject had to choose a move between the two available. Hence, subjects had to
play the games according to the representation that they themselves had constructed,
knowing they would be randomly paired with a different opponent in each game, and
19all this information was common knowledge. The instructions also speciﬁed that in the
case a subject had not been able to complete a representation within the time limit, the
representation would be constructed arbitrarily by the computer program. Furthermore,
the instructions stated that the payoffs in the games were calculated according to the
moves chosen by the two players on the basis of the correct representation. In this way,
a further incentive was introduced to represent the game correctly. At the beginning of
each game, players were randomly assigned to either COLOR or SIZE (corresponding
to the usual ROW and COLUMN roles in game matrices), and the two available moves
were labeled with the two symbols of spades and clubs. Subjects did not receive any
form of feedback at any time regarding their performance and/or their opponents’ deci-
sions. Figure 5 reports a sample of the graphical interface used in the ﬁrst part of the
experiment7.
= Fig. 5 here =
The experiment was run at the Computable and Experimental Economics Lab of the
University of Trento in three separate sessions and it involved a total of 68 subjects,
who were all undergraduate students who had never participated in similar experiments
before. Instructions were distributed at read aloud at the beginning of the experiment.
The overall time limit for the ﬁrst part was set equal to eight minutes, whereas no time
constraint was imposed in the second part. There was a show up fee of 3 euros plus
anything subjects could earn in the experiment. Average overall earnings were equal
to 14.8 euros; the experiment lasted sixty minutes on average, including the instruction
time.
7A ﬁgure displaying the graphical interface used in the second part can be downloaded from
www.unipg.it/˜devetag/Instructions GEB.htm.
204.2 Results
Table 7 reports the frequencies of correct responses in each representation task. The
observed frequencies in the different games mirror very closely those in experiment 1.
The Cochran test performed on the four samples is highly signiﬁcant (p = .000). Like-
wise, pairwise differences measured by a McNemar test are all statistically signiﬁcant
(coordination-chicken game: p = .002; coordination-PD: p = .000; conﬂict-chicken
game: p = .029; conﬂict-PD: p = .000; chicken-PD: p = .032), although the difference
between the coordination and the conﬂict games is only weakly so (p = .10).
23 subjects made no mistakes in any of the four tasks, and 4 subjects made four
mistakes. Hence, there is a total of 41 subjects who made from 1 to 3 mistakes, and
whose performance is therefore informative. A qualitative analysis of the individuals
strings of successes (1) and failures (0) reveals that 26 out of 41 strings (63%) are
strictly consistent with our hypothesized hierarchy of difﬁculty, against the 22% that
would be expected in case of randomly distributed errors (the difference is signiﬁcant at
the .001 level by a Chi-square test)8.
We then move to an in-depth analysis of the mistaken representations, which we
restrict to the chicken game and to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, because the number of
errors in these two tasks is sufﬁciently high.
Our conjecture is that the erroneously reconstructed matrices should diverge from
the correct ones in terms of their relational structure, and in particular that they should
reﬂect the difﬁculty of representing complex bi-orders.
Table 8 reports the empirical distribution of mistaken games classiﬁed by type of
bi-order. The numbers in parentheses report how many subjects chose a best reply
8This analysis, as well as the analogous analysis in experiment 1, would give the same results if
we included the strings of subjects who did everything right and those of the subjects who made four
mistakes. In fact, although these cases are not informative, they are not, as such, in contrast with our
hypothesized hierarchy of difﬁculty.
21given their (mistaken) representation. A useful benchmark is the distributionof possible
classes of bi-orders in 2X2 matrices. It turns out that, out of the 4! = 24 possible 2X2
matrices that one can build, only 1 is isotonic, only 1 is antitonic, 14 are projective and
8 are non-projective. In both the chicken and the PD case, the distributionof types of bi-
orders generated by our subjects signiﬁcantly differs from such distribution (p = .0003
for the PD case, and p = .02 for the chicken case, according to a Chi-squared test with
simulated p-value, 1,000,000 replicates). Furthermore, according to the same test, the
“erroneous PD” distribution is signiﬁcantly different from the “erroneous chicken” one
(p = .002). In other words, mistakes in the PD and in the chicken game are drawn from
different distributions.
Thus, representational errors are not random. In both cases, they show more iso-
tonic/antitonicinstances and less projective/nonprojectiveones than randomlyexpected
(p < .01, one-tailed Fisher exact test). At the same time, mistakes seem to reﬂect the
structure of the underlying representation problem: there are more projective than non-
projective mistaken representations in the chicken game, and the reverse holds in the
case of PD (p = .04, one-tailed Fisher exact test). Moreover, the chicken game is more
often associated with isotonicrepresentations than with antitonicones, whilethe reverse
is true for the PD game (p = 0.01, one-tailed Fisher exact test). Thus, the chicken game
is often transformed into a coordination game, while the PD game is often transformed
into a pure conﬂict game, although sometimes it still is transformed into a coordination
game.
An important issue is how representations interact with actual choice behavior. As
far as subjects that represent the games correctly are concerned, choices in the four
games conform to well-established behavioral principles (see table 9). In the coordina-
tion game, subjects predominantly play the strategy that supports the payoff dominant
equilibrium, although, especially when the two strategies have the same payoff sum,
as in the case of row players, many play the alternative, safer strategy. In the con-
22ﬂict game the distribution of behavior is different from the mixed strategy equilibrium
probabilities, due to a large extent to the fact that subjects take into consideration the
weight of out-of-equilibrium payoffs, as related experiments have shown (e.g., Goeree
and Holt, 2001). In the chicken game, the safer deferential action is more often played
than the more risky and aggressive one. Finally, in the PD about 2/3 of players defect,
but another third is cooperating.
Looking at the behavior of those who have misrepresented the game is more infor-
mative. We have suggested that, in general, when misrepresenting a game subjects tend
to generate representations which are structurally simpler than the “correct” one. Often
these representations also imply simple solution criteria. As a result, although subjects
often construct the wrong game representation, they act quite rationally in the light of
such erroneous constructs.
The data reported in table 8 on the number of subjects who best respond to their
erroneous representations seem to strongly support this claim, in that almost all subjects
choose rationally in each category of ‘simpliﬁed games’. A more detailed analysis of
some of these errors and the resulting choices is revealing: for example, 11 out of 17
subjects who have misrepresented the chicken game have reconstructed it as a game in
which a single strategy proﬁle yields the maximum payoff for both players - and 9 out
of these 11 subjects have played the strategy corresponding to such proﬁle. Of those 11
representations, 8 reconstructed the chicken game as a coordination game with a Pareto-
dominant equilibrium - and in 6 out of these 8 representations subjects have played the
strategy corresponding to that equilibrium. 5 of the 6 representations that do not have a
“common max” proﬁle have a dominant action - and once more 4 out of 5 subjects play
according to dominance.
Similarly, 21 out of 23 subjects who have misrepresented the PD game have intro-
duced a dominant strategy in their representation, and have acted almost always (18 out
of 21) according to dominance. Notice, however, that the dominant strategy in the er-
23roneous representations of the PD game does not necessarily correspond to defection:
8 players represent “cooperate” as the dominant action (and 6 play according to it).
From a different angle: 8 out of 23 subjects who have misrepresented the PD game have
played “cooperate” (i.e., have picked the strategy that is labeled as cooperation in the
correct game) and 7 of these 8 subjects have done it according to a principle of dom-
inance or Nash equilibrium. If these apparent cooperators are more rational than one
might have guessed, “defectors” with erroneous representations are not really defecting
in the game they have reconstructed: indeed, all but one of them have built a game in
which theequilibriumin dominantstrategiesfor bothplayers is also thesocial optimum.
In summary, no matter whether they cooperate or defect according to the labels that ap-
ply in the “true” game, most players that erroneously reconstructed the PD represented
it in such a way that the social optimum is also an equilibrium.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our experiments provide support for the view that not all normal form games are the
“same”, and that structural complexity matters; we suggest that besides the strategy
space, relational structure is a further source of cognitive difﬁculty, providing a ﬁner
classiﬁcation of two-person games. “Pure motive” games (i.e. monotonic payoff struc-
tures) are easier to represent, and even in the presence of “mixed motive” games, such
simpler structures act as irresistible templates of interaction. We also show that a fur-
ther classiﬁcation, involving the property of projectivity, is useful in deﬁning levels of
relational complexity.
We also show that the same ranking of representational difﬁculty applies when bi-
orders are explicitly embedded in the presentation of a game. Subjects aware that they
are setting the stage for interactive decisions experience the same increasing difﬁculty
as the payoff structure goes from isotonicity to non-projectivity. The analysis of the
24behavior of subjects that misrepresent the games reveals a few relevant features. 1)
Subjects tend to simplify representations, constructing models of the game that lower
its relational complexity. 2) In doing so, they still anchor to some structural features
of the “true” game. For example, in the PD, subjects still generate more non-projective
erroneous representations than in the chicken game. Furthermore, other features of the
correct game are preserved, although probably as a bi-product of other representational
processes; for example, dominance is preserved in most erroneous PD’s, whereas mul-
tiplicity of equilibria emerges in many erroneous chicken games. Given such simpliﬁed
representations, actual choice behavior follows simple but quite “rational” decision cri-
teria, such as dominance or selection of actions implementing payoff-dominant equilib-
ria. These results suggest a fresh reinterpretation of behavior in well known experimen-
tal games. We have shown that when subjects misrepresent the PD game, they tend to
eliminateitssocialdilemmanature, inawaythatboththe“cooperation”and“defection”
moves actually correspond to strategies that support perceived social optima.
Similarly, behavior in the chicken game can be sometimes interpreted as the result
of its subjective reframing as a coordination game with a payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Other well-documented behaviors ﬁnd a natural interpretation in this framework.
For example, a large literature in negotiation research has pointed out that bargainers
are often subjects to the “mythical ﬁxed pie bias” (Bazerman, 1983), which causes them
to wrongly assume that their interests are diametrically opposed. “The assumption of a
ﬁxed pie is rooted in social norms that lead us to interpret most competitive situations
as win-lose [...]. Humans tend to generalize from these objective win-lose situations
to situations that are not necessarily win-lose” (Bazerman, Baron and Shonk, 2001, p.
13). Within our framework, the ﬁxed pie bias is almost literally the transformation of
a complex bargaining game into a simpler, antitonic, antagonistic representation. Some
further evidence in this sense comes from a recent experiment on complex multi-issue
negotiations (Hyder, Prietula, and Weingart, 2000). The authors of the study observe
25that negotiators rarely achieve a Pareto-optimal solution to a given negotiation problem,
and they argue that the reason lies in their incorrect ‘default’ representation of the situ-
ation as a zero-sum game. In fact, representing the game as zero-sum would trigger the
almost exclusive use of distributive negotiation tactics (i.e., tactics aimed at achieving
unilateral concessions from the other party) at the expense of integrative tactics, which
would instead facilitate the achievement of agreements resulting in gains for both par-
ties involved. Hence, the use of speciﬁc behavioral strategies conducting to sub-optimal
agreements seems to derive, according to the authors, by an original failure of players
to represent the mutual gain area in the space of solution points.
Incidentally, it should be noted that games that present a more complex structure
are also more likely to be affected by superﬁcial cues or attention- directing devices
pointing to some simpler interaction structure. Such cues might act as cognitive af-
fordances driving the construction of a simpler representation. For example, Ross and
Ward (1996) have observed that behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma may be directed
towards cooperation or defection by manipulating its labeling either as a “Wall Street
game”or“Communitygame”. Pillutlaand Chen (1999)found similarcontextualeffects
in an experiment on Public Goods games. While of course such effects may also resent
of the weight of social norms and stereotypes of appropriate behavior, we submit that
the need for cognitivesimpliﬁcationmay play an important permissiverole in triggering
the search for principles that facilitate the construction of a new representation.
In addition, our results point to an important source of heterogeneity in a popula-
tion of game players, namely differences in the relative ability to correctly represent the
structure of strategic interaction. These differences are in parallel with observed differ-
ences in the depth of iterated thinking in games (e.g., Nagel, 1995, Camerer, 2003, ch.
5; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002). Interestingly enough, both types of heterogeneity
appear to be (weakly) correlated with differences in short term memory capacity, a mea-
surable psychological proxy of individual computational capability (Newell and Simon,
261972; Devetag and Warglien, 2003; Kareev, 1992). These observations may also help
understand how players transfer behavior from previously experienced games to new
ones. Knez and Camerer (2000) show that after playing a common interest coordination
game, individuals are more prone to cooperate in a PD. We suggest that the coordina-
tion game may act as a template for the cognitive simpliﬁcation of the subsequent PD.
In fact, our taxonomy may help to predict the direction of transfer phenomena from
simpler to more complex games.
Furthermore, we submit that monotonic structures may indeed be the prevailing
templates of bi-orders available in memory. In a classroom experiment, students asked
to provide examples of four arbitrary objects satisfying simultaneously two arbitrary
order relations of the kind depicted in ﬁg. 1 had no difﬁculties in ﬁnding examples for
monotonic bi-orders (such as “richer is happier” or “larger towns are less healthy”); but
they found it almost impossible to provide examples for non-projective bi-orders. This
point reinforces the result that in our experiment subjects unable to provide a solution
to the non-projective case resorted to monotonic orderings of the squares. Returning to
games, it also suggests that in incomplete information games “friends” and “enemies”
may be the most natural player types.
Our results may also provide some complementary cognitive ground to Ariel Ru-
binstein’s (1996) argument on the prevalence of linear order structures in discourse.
Rubinstein claims that linear orders have some efﬁciency properties (in indicating an
element out of a set, in being informative about a relation on a set, in minimizing the
number of examples necessary to describe a relation) that justify the higher frequency
with which these structures appear in natural language. Clearly, one can construct a
structure-preserving map from a monotonic bi-order to a linear order, either directly (as
in the isotonic case) or with an intermediate step by reversing one of the two order re-
lations (as in the antitonic case). The same cognitive constraints that make monotonic
bi-orders easier to represent may underlie the prevalence of linear orders in natural lan-
27guage. Projectivity is a more complex case: no simple way to reduce it to a single
linear order can be found. Yet, projectivity can be thought of as a kind of compatibility
between order relations, simplifying the task of managing bi-orders in short term mem-
ory. The relevance of the projectivity property in natural language suggests that further
connections with Rubinstein’s argument are worth seeking.
Finally, our results provide a ﬁrst, albeit partial, answer to what Colin Camerer
(2003) has placed among the top ten open research questions in behavioral game theory,
namely: “What game do people think they are playing?”(p. 474). Experimental game
theory has so far relied on the implicit assumption that the game subjects played was
the one provided by the experimenter. Our data suggest that this assumption may be
misleading, and that, more generally, individuals may indeed apply optimal decision
criteria to a misspeciﬁed strategic setting.
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32x y
x 3,3 2,2
y 1,1 4,4
Table 1:
A coordination game
(isotonic bi-order)
x y
x 1,4 3,2
y 4,1 2,3
Table 2:
A game of conﬂict
(antitonic bi-order)
x y
x 1,1 4,2
y 2,4 3,3
Table 3:
A game of chicken
(projective bi-order)
x y
x 2,2 4,1
y 1,4 3,3
Table 4:
A prisoner’s dilemma
(non-projective bi-order)
33group 1 (N=14) group 2 (N=16) Tot. N=30
Bi-order sequence number freq. sequence number freq. freq.
Isot. proj. 2 13 .93 3 15 .94 .93
Antit. proj. 1 9 .64 4 12 .75 .70
Proj. 4 7 .50 2 10 .62 .57
Non Proj. 3 6 .43 1 6 .37 .40
group 1 (N=20) group 2 (N=20) Tot. N=40
Isot. proj. 2 19 .95 3 19 .95 .95
Antit. Proj. 1 15 .75 4 18 .90 .82
Proj. 4 15 .75 2 14 .70 .72
Non Proj. 3 10 .50 1 9 .45 .47
Table 5: Experiment 1: numbers and relative frequencies of correct answers in the four
tasks in the Venice pool (upper part) and in the Trento pool (lower part). The second
column reports the order with which the tasks were presented to subjects in the two
different sub-groups.
34task unsuccessful subjects successful subjects p-value
coordination (isotonic) 5.3 (1.5;3) 5.9 (0.9;35) .563
conﬂict (antitonic) 5.2 (0.44;5) 6 (1;33) .011
chicken (projective) 5.4 (0.52;9) 6.03 (1.05;29) .033
PD (non-projective) 5.8 (0.78;19) 6 (1.15;19) .516
Table 6: Average STM score of subjects who err and of subjects who don’t err in each
task. The ﬁrst number between parentheses reports the corresponding standard devia-
tions, and the second number reports the number of subjects in each category. The last
column reports the p-value of the T-test for equality of means.
task correct answers
coordination (isotonic) 59 (.87)
conﬂict (antitonic) 53 (.78)
chicken (projective) 45 (.66)
PD (non-projective) 35 (.51)
Table 7: Experiment 2: numbers and relative frequencies of correct answers in the
representation task.
35isotone antitone projective non-projective
chicken game (n=17) 6(4) 0 9(9) 2(2)
PD (n=23) 5(4) 9(8) 3(3) 6(5)
Table 8: Experiment 2: empirical distribution of erroneous representations classiﬁed by
typology of bi-order (between parentheses: number of subjects that best respond to their
representation.)
36games
Coordination Conﬂict Chicken game PD
row x 0.45 0.19 0.36 0.68
y 0.55 0.81 0.64 0.32
col x 0.16 0.48 n.a. n.a.
y 0.84 0.52 n.a. n.a.
Table 9: Experiment 2: relative frequencies of choices of actions in each game, disag-
gregated by row and column role for the non-symmetric games. Only the choices made
on the basis of correct representations are reported.
37A B C D isotonic projectivity
antitonic projectivity
non monotonic
projectivity
non projectivity A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
Figure 1: Four examples of bi-order structures.
38Figure 2: A sample of the graphical interface used in experiment 1.
39A B C D ( ) [ ] { }
Figure 3: Bracketing for a projective bi-order.
40A B C D ( ) [ ] { }
Figure 4: Bracketing for a non-projective bi-order.
41Figure 5: A sample of the graphical interface used in the ﬁrst part of experiment 2.
42